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Since the early 1990s there has been much progress in understanding and taking into account
preference heterogeneity in probabilistic discrete choice models (e.g., Wedel and Kamakura
'1999;McFadden and Train 2000). The vast majority of models applied in marketing and applied
economics try to represent heterogeneity as some type of discrete or continuous distribution of
preferences. These relatively new types of statistical models have done well in comparisons
against simpler model forms like conditional multinomiallogit in terms of in- and out-of-sample
!fits,with fit performance often assessed against so-called "hold-out" sets. It is fair to say that
these models are long on statistical theory, but short on behavioral theory; the latter aspect is the
focus of this paper.
In particular, scientists typically spend time a) formulating hypotheses and/or theory, b)
testing deductions :from theory and/or hypotheses, or c) testing assumptions underlying theory
and/or hypotheses. The focus ofthis paper is on testing certain key assumptions about error
distributions implicit in all limited dependent variable models. It is rare to see these assumptions
tested, but it is important to do this to allow researchers to know if the assumptions are satisfied,
and to discuss the consequences if they are not.
To preface our discussion and results, we note that all statistical models in which the
dependent variable is latent confound estimates of model parameters with error variability. Thus,
if error variances are not constant across individuals and choice sets, estimated model parameters
will vary with differences in error variances. Moreover, if error variances are not constant one
carmot estimate unconfounded discrete or continuous distributions of preferences, and the
consequences of not satisfying this assumption can be serious. This paper focuses on the error
variance (or ''unobserved heterogeneity") associated with probabilistic discrete choice models.
:Wefirst discuss the role of the error variance in simple and more complex choice models, then
iwediscuss and illustrate the confound between model parameters and error variance, and then
we present and review academic research that demonstrates that it is unlikely that error variances
~e constant, but instead it is much more likely that the error variance is systematically related to
ill number of factors that we outline and discuss. Then we propose and discuss ways to deal with
iBystematicvariation in error variances. We conclude with some cautions about making claims
\based on current models, and summarize the key points in the paper.
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THE SCALE PARAMETER IN MNL
The familiar MNL model is a random utility model in which the errors are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (iid) as Type 1 Extreme Value random variates. That is
recall the familiar axiom of random utility theory: '
(1)
where Ujnis the latent utility that individual n associated with choice option j; Vjnis the
systematic or mean utility that individual n associates with option j; and Ejnis the random or
stochastic component of the utility of option n for individual n, which is assumed to be
distributed as Extreme Value Type 1. If individual n seeks to maximize her utility, we can model
the probability that she chooses option j as follows:
PUICn)= P[(Vjn + Ejn)> (Yin+ Ein)],for allj options in choice set Cs, (2)
where all terms are as previously defmed, except for PUICn),which is the probability that
option j is chosen by a randomly chosen individual n facing choice set Cu. If the errors are iid
Extreme Value Type 1, expression (2) leads to a closed-form expression for the choice
probabilities called the MNL (multinomiallogit) choice model (McFadden 1974). The
consequences of these error assumptions are that individuals are "preference clones" who share
the same fixed set of preference parameters. Variability in choices arises due to analysts'
misspecification of true utility functions, inability to account for all relevant factors in choice,
and other omissions and commissions.
These assumptions imply that the main diagonal of the error variance-covariance matrix is
constant, and all off-diagonal error covariances equal zero. The vector of unknown model
parameters can be expressed as a generalized regression function:
(3)
where all terms are as previously defined, except for ~kand Xkn.~k is a vector of empirical
parameters associated with a vector of factors that underlie choices, Xkn.The vector of
parameters is subscripted only with respect to the factors ("attributes") because they are fixed for
all individuals. The vector of factors is doubly subscripted to indicate that factors vary over k
dimensions but also (potentially) over people. The confound between error variance and the
estimated parameters can be expressed as follows:
(3)
where all terms are as previously defined, except for A,which is a "scale parameter".
Formally, in the case of MNL, A= SQRT(1t2 / 6 O"E2), where 1t is the natural constant 2.141 ... , and
O"Eis the standard deviation of the error distribution. We say that A"scales" the vector of
parameters because each parameter, ~k, actually is ~k/O"E'
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IMPLICATIONS OF SCALE IN MNL
The confound of scale and model parameters creates a fundamental identification problem,
with the consequence that MNL model parameters cannot be identified unless A is fixed to some
constant (almost always 1.0). Thus, the parameters "are identified up to scale", which means that
they can be identified once a constant is selected. The confound has no impact on predicted
probabilities in MNL if the error assumptions are satisfied. This confound is not new, and
discussions can be found in many sources like Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Swait and
Louviere (1993) and Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000). What is new is that more researchers
now realize that it is unlikely that error variances (and hence, scale) are constant in empirical
data; instead, it is more likely that error variances systematically vary with attribute levels varied
in choice experiments and real markets, as well as differences in individuals. For example, we
later show that error variances systematically vary with levels of attributes, and there is evidence
that survey respondents with low literacy skills have higher error variances than those with
higher skills (See Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000, Chapter 13).
A consequence of the confound is that it impacts magnitudes of estimated model parameters,
and by implication, statistical inference. Specifically, smaller error variances (large scales) lead
to larger model parameters, while larger error variances (small scales) lead to smaller model
parameters, all else equal. Not surprisingly, standard errors of parameter estimates also are
impacted - smaller scales lead to less precise estimates. Discussions of such issues can be found
ill workshop reports published in Marketing Letters since the advent of the modem Invitational
Choice Symposia that were proposed and initially organized by one of the present authors (1989,
Banff, Alberta, Canada). For example, discussion of the scale parameter ands its implications are
In Louviere, et al, (1999), Louviere, et al (2002) and Louviere, et al (2006). We now tum our
~ttention to the consequences if error variances are not constant.
WHAT IF SCALE Is NOT CONSTANT?
It is surprising that researchers have largely focused on preference heterogeneity to the
exclusion of most other likely sources of unobserved variability. There has been little research
into variance component models for discrete choices (for an exception, see Cardell 1997) that
explicitly recognize that errors can be decomposed into systematic components associated with
differences within and between individuals (the latter can be preference heterogeneity, but may
be related to other factors that differ between individuals), environmental and context
differences, temporal and spatial differences and other sources. Louviere, et al (1999) discuss
these issues in detail, so we only briefly summarize them here.
They suggest that scale is impacted by many factors that can be summarized in the following
general expression:
Y IX, Z, C, G, T, (4)
, where Y = behavioral outcomes of interest; X = directly observable or manipulated variables;r. == characteristics of the individuals; C = factors that vary over conditions, contexts,
Fircumstances, or situations; G = geographical, spatial or environmental factors that are relatively
Fonstant in one place, but may vary from place to place; and T = time varying factors. Thus, it is
!highlyunlikely that scale is constant; it is much more likely to be systematically impacted by a
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wide array of factors. Also, error variability is unlikely to be unidimensional, but probably varies
a) within consumers; b) between consumers; c) with measurement instruments; d) with market
and environmental differences; and e) with many other sources.
Anyone data source confounds many of the above sources of error variability, as discussed
by Louviere, et al (1999, 2002). So, most researchers have samples of size = 1, but claim
meaningful results! Single data sources limit generalizeability in many cases where potential
sources of - say - temporal and spatial variability are constant, making it unclear how to
generalize to past or future time periods or spatial locations. Thus, much more research into
combining sources of preference and choice data is needed.
SCALE OR PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY?
During the past decade many published choice models assumed that individuals are
heterogeneous in their preferences. Very few publications suggested that individuals also might
be heterogeneous in their error variances (or scales). We earlier noted that model parameter
estimates and scale are confounded; hence, if scale varies across individuals, distributions of
preference parameters will be confounded with distributions of scales. Later we provide evidence
that this occurs in empirical data, but we note that because model estimates actually are ~k/(J<:, it
should be clear that one can have a distribution of true ~k if and only if (J<: is constant. If ~k and
(J<: vary across individuals, observations, contexts, time and space, one cannot estimate a
distribution of f3k without separating f3k and (J<:. Of course, one can try to capture these effects by
estimating higher moments of assumed distributions, but adding more statistical complexity in
the form of additional latent effects does not seem warranted in the absence of better behavioral
theory.
That is, little behavioral theory is evident in recent choice modeling papers; most authors rely
on statistical theory. Limitations of single data sources suggest that without theory to suggest
how components of variance differ by individuals, markets, contexts, experiments, etc, adding
higher moments to choice models is probably a bad idea unless these distributions are constant
over such sources of variation. One only needs to consider predicting infrastructure projects like
toll roads or bridges years into the future to see that estimating higher moments is a bad idea as
they also have to be forecast into the future. A better way forward is to develop theory and
methods to capture variability differences. We now show how easy it is to confuse heterogeneity
in model parameters and scale, which should give researchers reasons to think before estimating
higher moments.
Consider two cases involving ten people in Table 5: 1) everyone has identical preferences for
travel times and costs of public bus systems, with scales equal to 1.0; only intercepts differ; 2)
scales vary across people, holding everything else constant. A key takeaway is that if scales vary
across people, they will seem heterogeneous in preferences even if they differ only in scale. The
last two columns show the processes are equivalent.
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Table 5: Consequences of Scale Varying Across Individuals
Condition 1:Only intercepts vary Condition 2: intercepts & scale vary
~Rro1 Irtff 1 tirel eml ~1 ul Irtff2 tirTP2 aH2 ~ u2 1u1*scaIeI
0 -1.00 -1.5 -1 1 1.fiJ -o.al un -o.aJ 0.20 o.ll o.lJ-~--
1 -0.75 -1.5 -1 1 1.75 -0.00 -1.aJ -0.00 o.m 1.40 1.40.... , -2.10 -1.40 1.40 2.00 2.m2 -o.fil -1.5 -1 1 2.00 -0.70
~~L~·.
,,- ............ -_. __ ...... -. :-0.25 -1.5 -1 1 2.25 -0.25 -1.!D -1.00 1.00 2.25 2.251--••._",_,, ___, - _ ..,-~._-._~--_......
4 0.00 -1.5 -1 1 2.fiJ 0.00 -3.00 -2.00 2.00 5.00 5.00•...'-- -----,
5 0.25 -1.5 -1 1 2.75 0.15 -0.00 -0. 1.65 1.65_ ...._-~._~ -- -"-.~.-----.--- .._ .._ ..-
6 o.fil -1.5 -1 1 3.00 o.aJ -O.ff> -0. 1.20 1.20---- _.
7 0.75 -1.5 -1 1 125 1.35 -2.70 -1.00 1.m 5.85 5.85
;>0-----'" •..,," ... ..- .......~.....
:
.......... _ ...............
8 1.00 -1.5 : -1 1 1fiJ 1.aJ -1.00 -1.aJ 1.20 4.aJ 4.20,..... ,--".. ~._~ •• ~_'.<A' __ • ___ "" .._._ •.-..-,_.~-,.
9 1.25 -1.5 -1 1 175 2.00 -2.4) -1.00 1.00 6.00 6.00
The above example assumes that timel = -1 and costl =-1
That is, the only difference in the left-hand and right-hand side parameters is scale. That is, if
one multiplies the left-hand side parameters by scale2, one obtains the right-hand side
Eameters. The last two columns show that multiplying ul (overall utility for a bus described by.' e = -1 and fare = -1 in condition 1) by scale2 produces the same outcome as u2 (overall utilityr a bus described by a time = -1 and a fare = -1 in condition 2).
Differences in scales across people can be consequential, as we now show. For example, let
person 0 from Table 5 face a choice among three buses as shown below:
Bus Time Cost Utility from Choice Utility from Choice
# left-hand side Prob ri~ht-hand side Prob
1 -1 +1 -0.5 0.506 -0.1 0.367
2 +1 -1 -1.5 0.186 -0.3 0.301
3 0 0 -1.0 0.307 -0.2 0.332
Ifperson 0 significantly differs from a scale of 1.0, which in this case is a scale of 0.2 (a
smaller scale, or larger error variance), choice probabilities can differ a lot even though the
person's preferences for time and cost d() not change. Thus, it is not possible to make meaningful
ltatements about preference parameter distributions without taking scale differences into account
tfthe same time.
How AND WHY WE KNOW THAT VARIANCES (SCALES) DIFFER
There has been a fair amount of research on scale. For example, reviews of research in this
trea can be found in Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000), Louviere, et al (2002), Louviere, et al
(~006); empirical work on size and scopes of error assumption violations can be found in Train
&odWeeks (2005), Louviere and Islam (2004), Louviere (2004), DeShazo and Fermo (2002),
SWaitand Adamowicz (200la,b), Louviere, et al (2002), Dellaert, Brazell and Louviere (1999)
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and Ohler, et al (2000), to name only a few. The preceding discussion and cited sources discuss
several consequences if error variances are not constant, such as:
1. Estimates of price sensitivities (elasticities) or other policy effects may be misleading;
2. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) or other policy estimates may be misleading.
3. Forecasts may be biased and may depart significantly from reality.
4. Randomness in parameters confounds scale and real preference heterogeneity.
5. Hyperparameters in HB and/or MIXL are affected, and Latent Class model differences
may be misleading.
In particular, differences in people may be reflected in parameter estimates, scale differences
and/or some combination of both. The table below shows that individuals can be in the same part
of the probability distribution with small parameters and a large scale or small scale and large
parameters. These outcomes are observationally equivalent, which implies that more research is
needed to separate parameters and scale. The table also suggests that researchers need to
recognize that scale can be related to factors varied in choice experiments, factors that managers
control, individual differences, environment, context, temporal and/or spatial differences. We say
this again to emphasize that ignoring variability sources and/or assuming them away is
dangerous and limits generalizeability. It also begs the question of how to deal with scale; later
we discuss two ways to deal with scale in choice experiments.
True Preference Parameters
Scale Small Large
Small Complimentary Processes Potentially Observationally
/ Equivalent
Large Potentially Observationalfy Complimentary Processes
Equivalent
As noted by several authors, such as Louviere, et al (1999), one must combine multiple
sources of data to make real progress in separating components of variance. This is not merely an
academic issue because one cannot correctly predict choices in real markets if variance
components differ between model estimation data sources and the market( s) to be predicted. So,
instead of being seen as a convenient (or annoying) statistical assumption, researchers should
begin to recognize that scale (or error variance) is a behavioral phenomenon that needs to be
understood in its own right.
We now discuss how scale varies with choice experiment design. Example one is from an
honours thesis by Chelsea Wise (Louviere and Wise 2004). She designed four conditions to vary
attributes: 1) only brand and price, 2) brand, price + four less salient attributes, 3) brand, price +
four more salient attributes; and 4) brand, price + all attributes. Figure 1 graphs the relative
variability from each of these conditions. The least variability occurs for the least complex task
(only brand and price), followed by a task with brand, price and more salient attributes. Higher
variability occurred for tasks with less salient attributes and all attributes. These results are not
"surprising". It is surprising that inequality of variances in choice data has received so little
research attention.
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Figure 2 is the conditional (mean) price response curves estimated from Wise's four
conditions, which show that price slopes differ systematically with relative variability in each
condition. Thus, the four conditions exhibit different choice probabilities, and the differences at
due to differences in choice variability.
Figure 2: Differences in Price Response Curves by Experimental Condition
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Figure 3 shows a relationship between relative variability and price levels in Wise's data.
Each point is an estimate of the variability for each price level, analogous to a random
coefficients result with a different standard deviation for each price level. The graph shows
choice variability is not constant, but varies systematically with price levels.
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Figure 3: Relationship between Relative Choice Variability and Price Levels
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Islam and Louviere (2004) provide another example. They designed 64 experiments to vary
attribute presence/absence. Brand and price were always present; the design dictated other
attributes that vary. Figure 4 shows relative choice variability associated with each level of
percent real fruit juice or the juice price. In the case of percent juice, there also is an estimate of









:t:: 0.1 1.9•• >.~ 0 :l: 1.8
C -o.i :c 1.7ca III 1.6CI) -oz .;:












Figure 4 shows that the relative variance is an inverse-U shaped function of the percent real juice
and price levels. Estimated effect of "missing" for percent real juice is nearly zero, implying that
when absent, it doesn't affect choices. Also, when absent, the relative variance decreases. The
relative variance increases when attributes are present, implying choice variability
increases/decreases as one "adds"/"subtracts" more attributes.
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We cited literature and reviewed empirical evidence that error variability in choice
experiments is not constant but varies systematically with many factors. Now we discuss two
ways that one can try to capture and control this variability in models.
CAN WE MODEL SCALE?
To model scale, one must specify scale as a function of observables. "Observables" are
factors that can be identified and measured (preferably also forecast into the future over space,
contexts, etc). For example, embedding attitudes in a model might "explain" some individual
differences, but it is hard to forecast them into the future. So, including them in models requires
strong assumptions about invariance over people, space, time, contexts, etc. This assumption is
unlikely to hold, so this is not a particularly good idea.
Covariance Heterogeneity Models (CHMs) are growing in popularity in applied economics
and marketing; examples include Swait and Adamowicz (1997; 200Ia,b); Hensher, Louviere and
Swait (1999); DeShazo and Fermo (2002) and Delleart, Brazell and Louviere (1999). Attractive
CHM properties include: a) simple and interpretable, b) closed form, c) captures attribute
interactions, even if not specified in mean components, and d) captures nonlinear effects even if
main effects are linear. CHMs mimic random coefficient models if one models error variability
and conditional response means jointly as a function of attributes varied in experiments. We can
express this CHM as follows:
where no is an intercept for the scale function, constrained to be positive (scale must be > 0);
(Xl is a vector of parameters associated with a design matrix of attribute effects, Xi and Xj; Bo is
an intercept for the mean (systematic) function; BlXi) is a vector of parameters associated with a
design matrix of attribute effects, Xi and X,
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We used CHMs to analyze 44 experiments designed by the UTS Centre for the Study of
Choice (funded by the Australian Research Council). Experiments combined attributes (4,8, 12,
16), numbers of attribute differences (nested under attributes), and relative design efficiency
(37% to 100%). Subjects were recruited from an opt-in panel, with 100 randomly assigned to
each experiment. The mean component was specified as a function of the effects-coded factors;
the scale component as a function of logarithms of numbers of attributes and design efficiency.






























The key takeaway in Table 6 is scale varies systematically with the number of attributes and
design efficiency. Prior to estimating the model in Table 6, we graphed estimated scale against
attributes and efficiency; this suggested both were approximately logarithmically related to scale.
Efficient designs maximize attribute differences; so the results imply that more efficient designs
that vary more attributes will increase choice variability at a decreasing rate, all else equal. The
example shows that CHMs can capture systematic relationships between unobserved variability
and factors varying within and between experiments, across individuals, contexts, etc. Now we
discuss another way to capture unobserved variability, namely estimating choice models for
single individuals.
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CAN WE ESTIMATECHOICE MODELS FOR INDIVIDUALS?
The Australian Research Council funded a team in the Centre for the Study of Choice at UTS
to develop theory and design methods to estimate choice models for single people (Louviere,
Marley, Street and Burgess 2004). We now briefly describe some empirical work that focused on
potential constraints on sizes of problems that can be handled with this approach. Specifically,
we designed 66 experiments to vary a) 11 combinations of two- and four-level attributes ranging
from a 23 x 43 to·a 48 X 24, b) number of options per choice set (3, 4 or 5) and c) category
(delivered pizza or cross country flights). Subjects were web panelists recruited from an
Australian opt-in panel; approximately 20 subjects were randomly assigned to each of the 66
conditions.
Below we report the results of one condition with 32 choice scenarios (sets), and four options
described by 10 attributes (33 x 2\ To date we have analyzed the smallest and largest of the 66
conditions, and have been able to estimate models for all individuals in these conditions. This
one condition is one of the larger conditions, but otherwise is not unique in any way; the model
estimation results are summarized in Table 8, which can be interpreted like the results of a
random coefficient model. Table 8 contains the summary statistics for effects-coded MNL
models for the individuals in the sample. One does not need to make assumptions about
distributions of preference parameters in this case because (by definition) one has the empirical
distribution for this sample population. A key takeaway from Table 8 is that standard errors for
numerical attributes like fare are not constant; they are systematically related to the attribute
levels.
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a e " ummary a s cs or n IVl ua o e SID ne on I on"
Effect N Mean StdErr StdDe~ T·Stat
ASCl 20 0.0205 0.0511 0.2286 0.4005
ASC2 20 0.0409 0.0530 0.2369 0.7718
ASC3 20 -0.0134 0.0500 0.2237 -0.2675
Flyinq time 1 20 0.1507 0.0562 0.2511 2.6845
Flyinq time2 2C 0.030E 0.0236 0.1057 1.2925
Flyinq time3 2C 0.0115 0.0187 0.0834 0.6173
Farel 2C 0.4650 0.075C 0.3352 6.2037
Fare2 20 0.1550 0.0434 0.1943 3.56n
Fare3 20 -0.1013 0.0392 0.1753 -2.5842
theckin 20 0.0226 0.0179 0.0801 1.2597
Airlinel 20 0.1263 0.0450 0.2010 2.8103
Airline2 20 -0.0289 0.0335 0.1500 -0.8633
Airline3 20 -0.0175 0.0399 0.1786 -0.4395
Meals 20 -0.0423 0.0127 0.0570 -3.3222
Entertainment 2C -0.0151 0.0097 0.0434 -1.5535
Wait time for Baqs 2C 0.0678 0.0293 0.1312 2.3119
Frq Flyer rewards 2C -0.0059 0.0165 0.0737 -0.3584
Number of Stops 20 0.0153 0.0092 0.0410 1.668E
X>OnTime departures 20 0.0442 0.0185 0.0826 2.3945
Free Alcohol 20 0.0138 0.0145 0.0648 0.9511
Free Drinks 20 -0.0629 0.0174 0.0776 -3.6273
11bl 8 S St ti ti f I divid 1M d I " 0 C diti
Experimental subjects were asked to choose most and least preferred options in each
scenario; questions were repeated to order options, which also yields frequencies of choices in
each scenario. This allows calculation of individual error variances (sums of squared residuals).
Figure 6 is a graph of mean squared residual sums (MRSs) versus four fare level estimates across
individuals. Random utility theory predicts four straight lines converging to zero as the MRS
increase. Each person is represented by four points on the graph; vertical lines on left- and right-
hand sides indicate two subjects.
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Figure 6: Mean Square Residuals Versus Fare Parameter Estimates
0.60







A key takeaway in Figure 6 is that variation in estimated fare parameters is due largely to
MRS differences. That is, Figure 6 implies that a "random scale" model (a distribution of
mdividual scales) should fit as well as (if not better than) a fare preference distribution model.
We can test this hypothesis by interacting the effects-coded design columns associated with each
four level attribute with the individual MRS values. If the MRS values contribute nothing to the
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Effect EstimatE StdErr T-Sta pm
ascl -0.212 0.050 -4.25E 0.000
~sc2 -0.151 0.049 -3.061 0.002
asc3 -0.127 0.050 -2.52S 0.011
ascl x MRS 0.912 O.13S 6.612 0.000
asc2 x MRS 0.753 0.13S 5.462 0.000
asc3xMRS 0.447 0.141i 3.082 0.002
Flyinq timel 0.28E 0.037 7.805 O.OOC
Hvinq time2 0.03£ 0.039 0.838 0.402
Flyinq time3 -0.06£ 0.039 -1.60C1 0.108
FTl xMRS -0.475 0.117 -4.062 0.000
FT2 x MRS -0.091 0.120 -0.760 0.447
FT3 x MRS 0.169 0.120 1.411 0.15S
Farel 0.768 0.034 22.490 O.OOC
Fare2 0.319 0.03S 8.166 O.OOC
Fare3 -0.1ge 0.044 -4.480 O.OOC
Fare1 x MRS -1.24, 0.10S -11.576 0.000
Fare2 x MRS -0.64E 0.123 -5.261 0.000
Fare3 x MRS 0.373 0.132 2.831 0.005
~irlinel 0.058 0.039 1.47c 0.13C1
lAirline2 -0.059 O.03e -1.545 0.122
lAirline3 0.020 0.011 1.861 0.063
Alinel x MRS 0.330 o.ne 2.846 0.004
Aline2 x MRS -0.29" 0.124 -2.365 O.OU
Aline3x MRS O.17S 0.119 1.494 0.135
Meals -0.03£ 0.011 -3.011 0.003
Entertain -0.015 0.011 -1.364 0.173
GetBaqs 0.054 0.011 4.948 0.000
FrQFlyer -0.006 0.011 -0.551 0.582
WStops O.OlL 0.011 1.042 ozss
YoOnTime 0.03E 0.011 3.325 0.001
lAlcohol O.OOC: 0.011 0.791 0.429
Drinks -0.05E 0.011 -5.311 0.000
ICheckin 0.029 0.038 0.767 0.443
1: bl 8 'r ti MRS b Attrib t L IEfti t
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MRS x attribute level interactions are bolded in Table 8. Many interactions are highly
significant; hence, individual-level error variance differences significantly impact model results.
The results also suggest that individuals differ in levels of error variability; hence, constant error
variability assumptions are wrong; the results also are not unique to this experimental condition.
Constant variances within individuals also are unlikely. The graphs below show that individual-
level MRSs values are systematically related to levels of prices and pizza toppings for the first
three individuals in the Table 8 dataset. Again, there is nothing unusual about these three
individuals; we chose only three to save space. The graphs suggest that error variances are
systematically related to the attribute levels for each person. Thus, error variances are not
constant within individuals, either.
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DOES ERRORVARIABILITY DIFFERBY SCENARIO ORDER?
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A team from the UTS Centre for the Study of Choice helped design a UK experiment to test
several hypotheses about welfare measures and choice experiments (led by Ian Bateman,
currently editor of EARE). We tested order effects on choice variability by designing a target 23
factorial that described changes in water quality and costs relative to a status quo (other designed
scenarios are not germane to the test). The 8 targets were shown as the first or last eight
scenarios; we also varied whether subjects saw/did not see a glossary with all attributes and
levels before the scenarios and whether a first (non-target) scenario described a large or small
change in quality. We used a latin square to control for order, which created 8 more conditions
that allow us to estimate models for each order condition. Individuals were randomly assigned to
a particular order condition x first/last condition x glossary x quality change.
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We estimated CHMs from the data for the glossary x quality change conditions for the first
and second set of eight scenarios, allowing separate scale parameters for each order. Below we
graph these results for each condition. Scenario order is on the X-axis; points on the graph are
estimates of scale for each of the four conditions. The left-hand side graph represents the
condition where the target scenarios appeared as the first 8; the right-hand graph represents the
condition where the target appeared as the second eight. These graphs show that variance
systematically varies across scenario orders.
Relative Variance Relative Variance
2'
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
All latent choice models confound scale and parameter estimates. The confound poses
particular problems in complex models like random coefficients models and latent class models.
If one merely wants to predict choice probabilities from choice models estimated from
experiments (seemingly the majority of applications), the models will predict well but will be
biased and incorrect. That is, it is likely that a) many random coefficient models are over-fit, b)
error distribution assumptions are not satisfied, and c) as Train and Weeks (2005) note, some
distribution combinations make little theoretical sense.
We began by noting the scientists care about assumptions that underlie models, and this paper
was about such concerns. That is, we were concerned about assuming that errors are iid, a
widespread assumption in random coefficient models. We noted that model parameter estimates
are "scaled" by standard deviations of error distribution, and unless this standard deviation is
constant for all observations, distributions of model parameter estimates will be confounded with
distributions of error variances. Evidence was provided to show that it is ygy unlikely that errors
are constant; instead, they are likely to be systematically related to different factors that we noted
in the paper.
So, the bottom line is that one cannot estimate individual-level parameters from complex
choice models unless one can separate scale and model parameter estimates. We discussed two
potential ways to do this: using various forms of covariance heterogeneity models and
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developing ways to estimate models for single persons. We illustrated both with empirical results
that reveal systematic relationships between the attribute levels manipulated in choice
experiments and error variability. Thus, it is highly likely that random coefficient models are
biased and misleading. Moreover, it is well-known that virtually all choice models fit to choice
experiment data will fit the data well (See, e.g., Dawes and Corrigan 1974), and so good fits and
predictions to sets of hold-out choices are largely useless to test the validity of choice models
estimated from experiments.
The field needs research that will lead to new models that can capture both scale and
systematic component (mean) effects. The field also would benefit from research that leads to
better and more useful behavioral theory. What the field defmitely does not need is more
complex statistical models, and it would be beneficial for academics in marketing to admit that
there are serious issues associated with these classes of models, and that just because one can
formulate and estimate complex statistical models does not mean that one should in fact do this.
So, it is now time for marketing researchers to acknowledge these issues and to move on to more
promising and less obviously empirically incorrect methods and models.
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